Madison’s Independent Police Oversight Is Three Days From Being Gutted
- Alex Saloutos
- 10 hours ago
- 20 min read
Key Points
On April 21, the Common Council will vote on proposed changes to Madison’s police oversight ordinance that would subject the Office of the Independent Police Monitor to mayoral control and restrict its access to MPD records and independent legal advice.
Taken together, the proposed changes would make the Independent Monitor subservient to the Mayor and the Police Department, the very agency the OIM is charged with overseeing. That is the opposite of what the Council intended in 2020.
City Attorney Michael Haas says the proposed changes clarify the Council’s original intent from 2020, but his own 2020 memos describe the oversight structure as a deliberate and unusual departure from standard City practice.
The Police Civilian Oversight Board voted unanimously on March 25 to recommend placing the proposed changes on file with prejudice, telling alders the Board had not been consulted before the changes were drafted, and asked the Council to work collaboratively with them on any changes.
On the evening of March 25, 2026, the Police Civilian Oversight Board gathered for its regular meeting. The Board had first received the proposed changes by email six days earlier, on March 19. The resolution was introduced at the Common Council meeting on March 24 and referred to the PCOB for consideration at its March 25 meeting. Waiting for its members that evening was an eight-page legal memorandum from City Attorney Michael Haas, delivered that same day, defending the proposed changes to the ordinances that created the OIM and PCOB in 2020. Haas was there in person to present his case.
The Board voted unanimously to reject the proposed changes and to recommend that the Council place them on file with prejudice, meaning they cannot be reintroduced for at least 60 days. Board members told several alders that the proposed changes had come as a surprise, that the Board had not been consulted or involved in drafting them, and asked for meaningful collaboration with the Council before any changes were drafted.[1]
The Common Council votes on those proposed changes on April 21. Three days from now.
What the Proposed Changes Would Do
The version scheduled for the April 21 vote is a substitute Govindarajan introduced this week, replacing his original March proposals.[18]
Govindarajan’s substitute[2] makes three changes that would substantively affect the OIM’s independence and right to unfettered access to MPD records. A fourth, Alder Mayer’s separate amendment, would add a sitting alder as a voting member of the PCOB.
The first and most significant change requires the OIM to comply with all applicable Administrative Procedure Memoranda (APMs), which are directives issued and approved by the Mayor.[18] The current ordinance does not require the OIM to comply with all APMs.
The second change removes “computer databases” from the list of records to which the OIM has “unfettered access” under MGO § 5.19(7)(i), and conditions OIM’s access to records on a Memorandum of Understanding negotiated with MPD and the City Attorney’s Office.[18] The substitute adds language stating that the MOU “shall not restrict the categories of records, or data to which the OIM is entitled,” but does not define “mechanics” and says nothing about maintaining the OIM’s right to unfettered access.
The third change assigns the City Attorney exclusive authority over the OIM’s legal advice in public records, open meetings law, employment matters, and MPD records access disputes. It would eliminate the Monitor’s existing right under MGO § 5.19(7)(l) to “retain independent legal counsel if necessary to fulfill the duties of the OIM.”
The fourth change, from Alder Mayer, adds a mandatory sitting-alder seat to the PCOB. Under the current ordinance, nine of the eleven voting members are nominated by designated community-based organizations. The Monitor is recruited and appointed by the PCOB with no role for the Mayor. Requiring a sitting alder to serve as a voting PCOB member introduces direct elected-official representation into a body deliberately designed to operate independently of political influence.
Govindarajan’s substitute also adds quarterly reporting requirements for the OIM and expands the specificity of the PCOB’s annual report. These provisions raise no independence concerns and are not the subject of this post.
Taken together, these four changes to the OIM’s independence and access rights would move the OIM and PCOB closer to the standard boards-and-commissions model the Council deliberately rejected in 2020.
Haas argues the three changes “reflect the original intent of the Common Council” and “only reinforce and do not change” the OIM’s relationship to the City.[3]
The legislative record from 2020 says otherwise.
The Legislative Record Haas Ignores
On June 1, 2020, Mayor Rhodes-Conway introduced a proposal to place police oversight directly in the Mayor’s Office, under a position called the Independent Police Auditor.[4] The Council did not adopt it. Instead, it adopted a different ordinance, MGO §§ 5.19 and 5.20, which placed the OIM under PCOB supervision rather than the Mayor, on a 19-0 vote with 746 registrants in support.[5]
Haas was in the room throughout. His office produced five successive ordinance drafts and three comparative spreadsheets analyzing how peer cities resolved the precise structural questions now at issue, including supervisory structure, records access, and independent legal counsel.[6] The Workgroup that produced the final ordinance considered and explicitly rejected a split supervisory model that would have given the Mayor or another City administrator control over the Monitor.
On August 21, 2020, Haas issued a formal memorandum to the Mayor and all alders. In it, he wrote that placing the Monitor under PCOB supervision rather than the Mayor was “relatively unique” and “to a large degree, different from oversight models nationwide,” and that “the majority of managerial employees are hired and supervised by the Mayor.”[7] He described a conscious departure from the administrative baseline, not a routine practice.
His 2026 memo omits this information. It argues instead that requiring the OIM to operate within the Mayor’s administrative structure and comply with all APMs merely “reinforces and does not change” the OIM’s relationship to the City.
Those two positions cannot both be true. Either placing the OIM outside the Mayor’s supervisory chain was a deliberate and unusual departure from standard City practice, as Haas said in 2020, or requiring the OIM to comply with all mayoral APMs is a clarification of existing practice, as he argues in 2026. The legislative record, written largely by Haas and his staff, answers that question clearly.
The provision is also internally inconsistent in a way that matters. The same subsection says the OIM “shall operate within the administrative structure of the City of Madison for purposes including, but not limited to, hiring and management of staff other than the Independent Monitor, contracting, budgeting, use of technology, and procurement.” That sentence appears to limit the administrative structure requirement to specific operational functions, suggesting the drafter intended a boundary between administrative compliance and investigative independence. But the APM sentence that follows imposes no equivalent limitation. It does not say APMs governing hiring, contracting, budgeting, technology, and procurement. It says all applicable APMs, period. Under Madison’s own rules of ordinance construction, MGO § 1.01(1) states that “all words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language.”[19] Under that standard, “all applicable APMs” means what it says in plain English. MGO § 1.03(3) further provides that “if conflicting provisions be found in different sections of the same chapter the provisions of the section which is last in numerical order shall prevail.”[20] The independence protection in MGO § 5.19(6)(b), which prohibits City officials from using their position to influence the Monitor, and the APM compliance requirement in proposed § 5.19(6)(c) are in direct conflict. Under § 1.03(3), (c) prevails over (b). The City’s own rules of ordinance construction therefore confirm that the APM requirement controls over the independence protection, not the other way around. The proponents’ argument that the independence language limits the APM requirement is reversed by the City’s own code.
On March 25, 2026, City Attorney Michael Haas sent the Council and PCOB an eight-page memorandum defending the proposed changes. This post draws on the rebuttal memo I submitted to the Council on April 13.[21] When I reviewed the full 2020 Workgroup record for that memo, the evidence was not ambiguous. That record spans more than 100 documents — five successive ordinance drafts produced by the City Attorney’s Office, three comparative spreadsheets analyzing how peer cities resolved the precise structural questions now at issue, a legal opinion from the nonpartisan Wisconsin Legislative Council, and public comments from 1,834 people who wrote in support of the ordinance and 16 who wrote in opposition. It was built on the prior work of the Madison Police Department Policy and Procedure Review Ad Hoc Committee, which submitted a final report to the Common Council in October 2019 containing 177 recommendations. Three alders chaired or served on the Workgroup itself, and at least nine more attended its meetings. The Council had two models before it: oversight in the Mayor’s Office or under an independent civilian board. The Council chose the second and rejected the first. When a legislature votes for one of two clear options after that kind of record, that is the clearest possible statement of original intent.
The Workgroup’s Own Words
The drafting Workgroup was equally clear. In its final report, the Workgroup listed as a core priority “the need for the Civilian Oversight Board and Independent Police Monitor to be independent from both the Madison Police Department and City elected officials and staff.”[8] That language names elected officials and staff. APMs are mayoral directives to City staff. Requiring the OIM to comply with all APMs gives the Mayor the ability to control the OIM’s operations, bypassing the Council entirely, over the explicit objection of the body that drafted the ordinance.
The drafting history adds another layer. Earlier drafts of MGO § 5.19 contained only an “Independent from MPD” provision. A separate “Independent from City Staff and Officials” protection was added in the July 23, 2020 draft, specifically to bar City officials from using their positions to influence or undermine the Monitor’s work.[9] The Council strengthened the independence framework during the drafting process. The proposed changes would reverse that deliberate choice and call it a clarification.
The supervisory structure itself went through a similar evolution. The July 13, 2020, draft of the ordinance included a blank line for a second supervisory reporting line for “day-to-day human resource issues, such as time off, payroll, and other similar issues.” By the July 23 draft, that was removed entirely. The final enacted language provides that the Monitor “shall report directly to the Board and the Board’s Executive Subcommittee.” The Workgroup deliberately excluded a mayoral or administrative HR role. And no requirement that the OIM comply with mayoral APMs appeared in any of the five successive ordinance drafts the Office of the City Attorney (OCA) produced during the Workgroup process.
The nonpartisan Wisconsin Legislative Council reached the same conclusion in a June 25, 2020, memorandum. Staff Attorney Peggy Hurley found the independent oversight structure legally sound, with no suggestion that independence from the Mayor was problematic or that mayoral APMs were required.[10] The Council had that analysis before voting 19-0.
The Conflict Haas Does Not Acknowledge
Haas argues that his office can advise the OIM without conflict because the City Attorney represents the City as an organizational client, not individual officers or employees. He describes a practice of “walling off” attorneys when conflicts arise.
That argument misses the point. The question is not whether the attorneys in his office are ethical. The question is whether the City Attorney, as the City’s and MPD’s legal representative, is the appropriate source of legal advice for an office whose mission is to investigate and oversee MPD. Those roles pull in opposite directions.
Haas’s own office supplied the clearest answer to that question on April 8, 2026 — two weeks after his March 25 memo arguing the OIM must rely exclusively on his office for legal advice. The Board of Public Works held a hearing on a Privilege in Streets Application Denial. Because the OCA had previously advised City staff on the same matter, the Board used outside counsel to ensure there was no conflict of interest.[11]
Haas may argue that his office made that call, which is precisely the problem. If an independent oversight agency like the OIM must rely on the City Attorney to decide when it needs independent counsel, it is not independent.
The OIM’s situation is structurally identical. The City Attorney advises MPD. The OIM oversees them. By Haas’s own standard, that structure requires independent counsel for the OIM, not exclusive reliance on the City Attorney.
Madison already accepts this principle in another context. The City has retained independent outside counsel for the Police and Fire Commission since at least 1980.[22] In April 2024, the Council and Mayor reauthorized that arrangement, explicitly because the OCA is responsible for representing the Police or Fire Chief in disciplinary hearings.[12] The Council and the Mayor have already recognized that when the City Attorney represents actors in police matters, the oversight body requires its own independent legal counsel. The proposed change would eliminate that protection for the one body with the broadest mandate to oversee MPD.
On the statutory question, Haas cites Wis. Stat. § 62.09(12)(a) for the general rule that the City Attorney shall conduct all law business in which the City is interested. But in the same paragraph he cites the exception: Wis. Stat. § 62.09(12)(g), which authorizes the Common Council to “employ and compensate special counsel to assist in or take charge of any matter in which the City is interested.” MGO § 5.19(7)(l) is the Council’s exercise of that authority. It states: “The Monitor may retain independent legal counsel if necessary to fulfill the duties of the OIM.” The statutes Haas cites to limit independent counsel also expressly authorize it.
The Security Argument Has an Answer Haas Does Not Mention
Haas argues that removing “computer databases” from the OIM’s ordinance-level access rights is necessary because of FBI Criminal Justice Information Services security requirements. CJIS requirements are real. But Haas’s conclusion is not the only one available.
The FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Security Policy, the same policy that governs MPD’s own access to criminal justice records, includes a compliance framework specifically designed for criminal justice agencies that need access to those records, including oversight bodies like the OIM. The framework requires fingerprint-based background checks, CJIS Security Awareness training, and adherence to the FBI’s security policy areas. In Wisconsin, CJIS compliance is administered through the Wisconsin Department of Justice, not the City. Once an agency’s systems and designated staff meet those requirements, its personnel can access criminal justice records directly, without submitting individual records requests through the agency being overseen.
Haas’s memo ignores this pathway, treating CJIS as an obstacle rather than a framework with a known compliance solution. Because CJIS compliance runs through the state, the OIM could pursue it directly through WisDOJ without requiring the City’s cooperation or approval. This is not a theoretical option. Police oversight offices and staff in Alexandria, Virginia; Fort Worth, Texas; Dallas, Texas; and Portland, Oregon must comply with the CJIS Security Policy. Pursuing CJIS compliance for OIM systems and designated staff would address the security concern Haas raises and preserve the Monitor’s unfettered access rights under the ordinance. It would also save time and money for both agencies. Once OIM staff are CJIS-compliant, they can access records directly without submitting individual requests, and MPD staff no longer have to process them. If the concern is genuinely about security rather than about limiting access, that solution should be welcome.
The drafting history makes the computer database point with unusual clarity. “Computer databases” did not appear in the July 23, 2020, draft ordinance. It was added in the July 29, 2020 draft, authored by Assistant City Attorney John Strange, simultaneously with the addition of “to the extent permitted by law.” Both changes appeared in the same draft, both were carried through to the enacted ordinance, and the OCA reviewed the final text before the Council voted. Removing “computer databases” now does not clarify existing practice. It reverses a deliberate choice made during the drafting process that the City Attorney participated in and approved.
The substitute’s protective clause, stating the MOU “shall not restrict the categories of records, or data to which the OIM is entitled,” does not fully address this problem. The clause limits what the MOU can do to categories of records, but leaves the mechanics of access entirely open. An MOU that allows redactions, imposes advance-notice requirements, mandates consultations, designates contacts, or imposes waiting periods is not unfettered access, even though it does not “restrict the categories of records.” Once “computer databases” is removed from the ordinance, moreover, the OIM has no ordinance-level right to them regardless of what the MOU says. The current ordinance already limits access “to the extent permitted by law,” meaning existing state and federal law governs what MPD must and cannot share. Removing “computer databases” adds an additional, local restriction on top of those existing legal limits.
The January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding between MPD and the OIM illustrates how the records access issue has already been mishandled. Haas signed it as a witness alongside Police Chief Shon Barnes and then-Independent Monitor Robin Copley. Several provisions of that MOU narrowed the OIM’s access rights below those guaranteed by the enabling ordinance. It routes OIM’s data requests through MPD’s public records process rather than recognizing the direct “unfettered access” the ordinance grants. It requires OIM to consult with MPD before publicly releasing information about active investigations or personnel matters, a condition not found in MGO § 5.19(7). It can be amended only with the consent of both the Police Chief and the Independent Monitor, witnessed by the City Attorney, effectively giving MPD and the OCA joint veto authority over any future changes. The PCOB was not consulted before the agreement was executed, despite the ordinance’s requirement that the Monitor act as directed by the Board. As legal counsel to both MPD and the OIM, he signed as a witness to an agreement that narrowed rights his own office’s ordinance guarantees, and he is now citing that agreement to make those restrictions permanent. The right response is not to make the MOU’s additional restrictions permanent. It is to undo them.
The department heads Govindarajan cited as justification for the proposed changes do not appear especially persuaded by his rationale. In separate April 1, 2026, emails to PCOB Chair Maia Pearson, HR Director Hillson and IT Director Edgerton each confirmed that the compliance concerns Govindarajan raised in his March 24 email were issues with the previous Monitor, Robin Copley, and are not current problems under the current administration.[13] Edgerton was explicit: the examples she had provided to Govindarajan were issues the City had to address with the previous Monitor and are not existing issues.
By the department heads’ own admission, the compliance problems used to justify the proposed changes have already been resolved.
Edgerton’s email also confirms that the proposed APM provision is substantive rather than clarifying. She wrote that Independent Monitor Glass had told her she was uncertain whether the APMs were legal requirements the OIM was obligated to follow, and that Edgerton agreed the current ordinance language is not clear on that question. The IT Director thus confirms the current ordinance does not require OIM compliance with all mayoral APMs. Adding this requirement changes the ordinance and narrows the Monitor’s independence. It does not clarify it.
This is not an abstract concern. In November 2025, Chief Patterson suspended the OIM’s direct access to MPD records and databases, alleging violations of City IT security APMs by OIM staff as his justification. A review of the APMs he cited confirms that none of them authorize the Police Chief to suspend an office’s access to MPD records as a remedy for an information technology compliance issue. The suspension was a violation of the ordinance. Codifying the APM compliance mechanism in the ordinance gives the instrument that caused the violation permanent legal force. The Council would be voting to legalize the mechanism that was used to violate the ordinance it passed in 2020.
The Alder Who Won’t Be There
One more fact the Council should weigh before voting: Alder Govindarajan, who introduced the proposed changes, did not seek reelection on April 7, 2026.[14] He will not serve on the Council when it considers his proposals on April 21. The proposed changes he drafted will be decided by a body that does not include him, on a schedule he set before leaving office, for a set of problems his own department heads say no longer exist. He introduced those changes based on staff complaints without seeking the Independent Monitor’s or the PCOB’s account of the same events. Govindarajan joined the Council in April 2023, three years after the ordinance passed. His memo uses the word “clarify” or a derivative fourteen times to defend the changes. It cites no document from the 2020 deliberation. His basis for calling these changes clarifications is a list of operational complaints, most of which the department heads he cited say are no longer current issues. He treated staff allegations as established fact. He did not verify the alleged policy violations with the OIM or the PCOB before introducing the ordinance.
Only three of the twenty current Council members served when MGO §§ 5.19 and 5.20 were adopted in 2020.[15] The other seventeen were not part of the legislative process. They are now being asked to vote on these proposed changes based largely on Haas’s March 25 memo and Govindarajan’s April 15 legislative memo rather than the full 2020 legislative record. That record is in Legistar. A detailed review of that record is in the rebuttal memo submitted to the Council on April 13.[21] Both should be read before April 21.
What the Council Should Do
The PCOB voted unanimously on March 25 to recommend placing the proposed changes on file with prejudice and asked that any alders interested in changes work collaboratively with the Board before drafting them. The Council should follow it.
The proposed changes, considered together, would subject the OIM to mayoral control, restrict the Monitor’s access to independent legal advice, narrow the OIM’s ordinance-level access to MPD records, and add mandatory political representation to the PCOB itself. Each element reduces independence. Combined, they move the entire oversight structure closer to the standard boards-and-commissions model the Council deliberately rejected in 2020 on a 19–0 vote after five weeks of public deliberation.
If the Council believes any of the administrative concerns are genuine, language exists that addresses them without the structural damage. The rebuttal memo I submitted to the Council on April 13 proposes the following alternative for the APM provision:[21]
“The Office of the Independent Police Monitor shall comply with generally applicable City Administrative Procedure Memoranda. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize the Council or any City official to direct, limit, or interfere with the powers and duties of the Monitor and the Office of the Independent Police Monitor as set forth in MGO § 5.19(7).”
That language addresses neutral administrative compliance without giving the Mayor a rulemaking instrument over OIM operations or giving the Council open-ended enforcement authority over the Monitor’s actions.
Regarding records access, the security concern can be addressed through CJIS compliance without removing “computer databases” from the ordinance. My memo to the Council maintains the Monitor’s access to MPD’s databases and adds language that bars MPD from delaying access or requiring MPD’s prior approval:
“Such access shall not require MPD’s prior approval and shall not be conditioned on or delayed by any MPD determination regarding the status, sensitivity, or security classification of the requested records.”[21]
A companion provision would address CJIS compliance directly:[21]
“(1) OIM staff who access records or databases subject to applicable state or federal security requirements, including the FBI Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Security Policy, shall obtain and maintain the certifications, credentials, and training required by those frameworks as a condition of such access. OIM staff are subject to the same legal penalties as MPD personnel for any unlawful or unauthorized disclosure of records accessed under this section.”[21]
These solutions resolve the security concerns, preserve the Monitor’s unfettered access rights to all records, and reduce the administrative burden on both the OIM and MPD. This approach is consistent with NACOLE’s Principle 3 for effective civilian oversight, which states that unfettered access to law enforcement records is vitally important,[23] and with how oversight offices in Los Angeles, Portland, and other cities already operate, without the access failures Haas predicts.
These are not clarifications. They are fundamental changes hidden behind a euphemistic label. The Council should see them plainly for what they are and place these proposals on file with prejudice.
What You Can Do Before April 21
The Council votes on April 21. If you believe the original independence framework for the OIM and PCOB should be preserved, contact your alder now. You can find your alder’s contact information at the City of Madison’s alder directory.[16] The Legistar file for the proposed changes is File No. 92386, where you can read the full ordinance language and all associated documents.[17] You can also register to speak or register your opposition through the Council’s April 21 agenda page. Legistar File No. 92386 is agenda item 55. The agenda page, which includes instructions for registering to speak via Zoom, is at https://www.cityofmadison.com/city-hall/committees/common-council/2026-04-21
Tell your alder that requiring the OIM to comply with all mayoral APMs is not a clarification of existing practice. Haas said so himself in 2020. Tell them that the PCOB voted unanimously to oppose the proposed changes and was not consulted before they were drafted. Tell them that the department heads cited as justification have confirmed the compliance problems no longer exist. And tell them that the alder who introduced the proposed changes will not be there when the vote is taken.
The oversight structure that 1,834 Madison residents submitted public comments in support of in 2020 is three days away from being materially weakened. The Council should know that people are paying attention.
The Pattern
Madison’s police oversight system was built through a genuine public process that drew on national best practices, engaged hundreds of residents, and produced a substantial legislative record. The vote to create it was 19–0, with 746 registrants in support and 34 in opposition.
In the five years since, the Mayor proposed eliminating the OIM’s data analyst position in the 2025 budget. Three Council members moved to eliminate the office itself; that amendment failed 17–3 in November 2025. The Police Chief suspended the OIM’s lawful access to records through an administrative directive, contrary to City ordinance. And now a lame-duck alder has introduced changes that would subject the office to mayoral control and restrict the Monitor’s ability to get independent legal advice. Each of these moves has been described as a technical adjustment, a clarification, or a response to legitimate administrative concerns.
The 2020 legislative record is not a historical footnote. It is the true expression of the Council’s intent, and Haas’s 2026 memo does not cite a single Workgroup document. The legislative record contradicts him at every turn. He substitutes his own characterization for the evidence in the record. On April 21, the Council has a straightforward choice: place the proposed changes on file with prejudice, accept the PCOB’s invitation to work collaboratively on any changes, and address any legitimate administrative concerns through that process. The Council of 2020 built something the city needs badly: a truly independent oversight body with real access and real authority, approved 19 to 0, with 1,834 residents behind it, after five weeks of deliberation and more than 100 documents in the record. That work deserves more than a rushed vote on a lame-duck alder’s proposal.
77SquareMiles.com covers what mainstream media won’t, because democracy dies in darkness, especially at City Hall.
© Alex Saloutos 2026.
Footnotes [1] Police Civilian Oversight Board, Meeting Minutes, March 25, 2026, Legistar File No. 92386. https://madison.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=7150000&GUID=92386
[2] City of Madison Common Council, Legistar File No. 92386, introduced March 24, 2026. https://madison.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=7150000&GUID=92386
[3] City Attorney Michael Haas, Memorandum to Police Civilian Oversight Board Members and Common Council Members re: Proposed Amendments to MGO §§ 5.19 and 5.20, March 25, 2026, Legistar File No. 92386.
[4] City of Madison Common Council, Legistar File No. 60778 and Legistar File No. 60777, introduced June 1, 2020; not adopted. Available at https://madison.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4553158 and https://madison.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4551114
[5] City of Madison Common Council, Legistar File No. 61593, September 1, 2020 (MGO §§ 5.19 and 5.20 as enacted), 19-0 vote, 746 registrants in support and 34 in opposition. https://madison.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4628948&GUID=2AE7E769-4795-4BF3-9D07-1826D08BCEFC&Options=ID%7cText%7c&Search=61593
[6] Alder Workgroup to Develop Logistical and Operational Details for MPD Independent Civilian Oversight, Final Report, August 3, 2020, Legistar File No. 61667. Meeting records and draft ordinances at https://madison.legistar.com/DepartmentDetail.aspx?ID=43859&GUID=4CAD704F-4A86-4FD1-B1B9-DD4B1E646CA4
[7] City Attorney Michael Haas, Memorandum to Mayor and All Alders, “Independent Police Monitor/Civilian Oversight Body Discussion Topics,” August 21, 2020. https://madison.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=8757519&GUID=5D80DE96-4370-4D5E-916E-5B9D02865F67
[8] Alder Workgroup to Develop Logistical and Operational Details for MPD Independent Civilian Oversight, Final Report, August 3, 2020, at 2. https://madison.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=8704750&GUID=5398DE66-378A-421E-9026-675D31FCFC32
[9] Draft Ordinance, MGO §§ 5.16-5.17, July 23, 2020, § 5.16(6)(b), prepared by Assistant City Attorney John Strange. https://madison.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=8680547&GUID=52B5F4D7-3DC9-4807-A68F-1384D5B56858
[10] Wisconsin Legislative Council, Memorandum to Representative Chris Taylor re: proposed oversight structure, June 25, 2020, Staff Attorney Peggy Hurley. https://madison.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=8634865&GUID=8617DC51-0B17-49B1-ADC7-A202EC1416EE
[11] City of Madison Board of Public Works, Hearing on Privilege in Streets Application Denial, Legistar File No. 92558, April 8, 2026; email correspondence between Alex Saloutos and City Attorney Michael Haas, April 12, 2026. https://tinyurl.com/HAASEMAILS260412
[12] City of Madison Common Council, Resolution RES-24-00275, April 16, 2024, Legistar File No. 82492. https://madison.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=6572304&GUID=4EF1D246-5FF5-4D44-92FD-0ACDB305A7B6
[13] Erin Hillson, HR Director, Email to Maia Pearson, April 1, 2026. https://tinyurl.com/HILLSONEMAIL260401; Sarah Edgerton, IT Director, Email to Maia Pearson, April 1, 2026. https://tinyurl.com/EDGERTONEMAIL260401 (both produced in response to public records request)
[14] City of Madison Common Council election records, April 7, 2026.
[15] City of Madison Common Council membership records, 2020 and 2026.
[16] City of Madison, Alder Directory. https://www.cityofmadison.com/council/alder-directory
[17] City of Madison Common Council, Legistar File No. 92386. https://madison.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=7150000&GUID=92386
[18] City of Madison Common Council, Legistar File No. 92386, Version 2 (Substitute), introduced April 15, 2026. https://madison.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4628948&GUID=2AE7E769-4795-4BF3-9D07-1826D08BCEFC
[19] City of Madison, MGO § 1.01(1), Construction of Ordinances, General Rule: “All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language.” https://library.municode.com/wi/madison/codes/code_of_ordinances
[20] City of Madison, MGO § 1.03(3), References to Titles, Chapters, or Sections — Conflicting Ordinances: “If conflicting provisions be found in different sections of the same chapter the provisions of the section which is last in numerical order shall prevail unless such construction be inconsistent with the meaning of such chapter.” https://library.municode.com/wi/madison/codes/code_of_ordinances
[21] Alex Saloutos, Memorandum to Common Council re: Response to City Attorney’s Memorandum on Proposed Amendments to MGO §§ 5.19 and 5.20, April 13, 2026, Legistar File No. 92386. https://madison.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4628948&GUID=2AE7E769-4795-4BF3-9D07-1826D08BCEFC
[22] Former PFC Attorney Scott Herrick stated that he served in that role from 1980 to May 2019. See “Diverse group of civic-minded residents to pick next Madison police chief,” Wisconsin State Journal, October 4, 2019. https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/diverse-group-of-civic-minded-residents-to-pick-next-madison-police-chief/article_72b95b66-c79f-593c-9cd3-32b34d46ae7b.html
[23] National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE), Principle 3: Unfettered Access to Records and Facilities, Thirteen Principles for Effective Oversight (2020). https://www.nacole.org/principles