Council Rejects 11th-Hour Attempt to Kill Police Oversight

The 2015 shooting of Tony Robinson Jr. by Madison Police Officer Matt Kenny led to the creation of the Office of the Independent Monitor. This banner from the original 2015 protests was carried again at a 10th anniversary memorial march in March 2025. Photo: Ruthie Hauge/Cap Times.

At tonight's Common Council meeting, Alders Isadore Knox Jr. (District 14), Barbara Harrington-McKinney (District 20), and Joann Pritchett (District 9) introduced an 11th-hour floor amendment to defund the Office of the Independent Monitor. The proposal—which would have eliminated $405,299 in funding for the OIM and Police Civilian Oversight Board while redirecting those funds to Madison Police Department body-worn camera staffing—was circulated to alders at noon today, giving council members and the public just hours to review a measure that would effectively kill police civilian oversight in Madison.

City Attorney Michael Haas had confirmed in internal communications that eliminating funding through a budget amendment would be “enough to effectively end the office,” though the ordinances establishing the OIM would remain on the books until separately repealed.

The Common Council overwhelmingly rejected the amendment by a vote of 17 to 3, then approved the city’s 2026 Capital and Operating Budgets. Below is the memo I submitted to all alders before the vote, urging them to reject this shortsighted attempt to abandon police oversight just as the office has a chance to get its deployment right.

My Memo to the Common Council

I urge you to reject the proposed floor amendment that eliminates funding for the Office of the Independent Monitor (OIM) and the Police Civilian Oversight Board (PCOB). While I understand the frustrations that have led to this proposal, defunding the OIM now would abandon a critical community need and accountability mechanism because of implementation and performance management mistakes that can be corrected, not because the need has disappeared or the strategy is flawed.

The Need for Independent Oversight Remains Essential

The OIM was created in response to urgent community needs following the 2015 death of Tony Robinson and other officer-involved shootings. The goal—providing independent civilian oversight of the Madison Police Department to ensure accountability and build trust across all segments of our community—is as vital today as it was in 2020. The problems that sparked the OIM's creation have not disappeared.

Madison created one of the most empowered police oversight agencies in the nation. The PCOB is one of only two boards nationally where the majority of members must be nominated by community organizations. This structure, recommended by the ACLU, ensures genuine independence and community representation. Dismantling this framework now would send a troubling message about our commitment to police accountability.

Deployment Problems, Not Strategic Flaws

The OIM has undeniably faced significant implementation challenges. The office has been slow to achieve operational status, has experienced leadership transitions, and has struggled to fulfill its mandate. These are serious concerns that warrant accountability. However, from a quality improvement perspective, these are classic deployment failures, not evidence that the strategy itself is flawed.

Independent civilian oversight of police departments is a proven strategy. Cities across the country—including Seattle, Portland, and San Jose—have successfully used independent monitors, inspectors general, and auditors to improve police accountability, strengthen community trust, and drive meaningful reforms. Seattle’s oversight system, which includes an Office of Police Accountability and an Office of Inspector General, helped the city achieve substantial compliance with its federal consent decree. San Jose’s independent auditor has been in place since 1993 and has issued detailed recommendations that have improved department policies and practices. These programs faced initial challenges and resistance, but with sustained commitment and proper support, they delivered results.

Consider the structural factors that contributed to poor performance:

• Inadequate oversight and support: The office was deliberately structured to be independent—a necessary feature for credible civilian oversight—but this independence was not balanced with appropriate administrative support, mentorship, and accountability mechanisms. As one alder noted, this “deprived the office of the administrative support, mentorship, and accountability necessary to perform at a high level.”

  
  

• Leadership challenges: By all accounts, the hiring decision for the first Independent Monitor did not adequately prioritize qualifications and relevant experience. This was a failure of the hiring process and the PCOB’s governance, not a failure of the OIM concept. Robin Copley’s recent resignation creates an opportunity to correct this mistake.

  
  

• Insufficient resources and unclear expectations: A three-person office tasked with monitoring a major police department was set up to struggle from the start. The absence of clear performance metrics and regular accountability reviews allowed problems to persist unchecked.

These are fixable problems. Dr. Edward Deming, the founder of the quality management movement, famously observed that 94% of workplace problems lie in the system, not in individual employees. The OIM’s struggles reflect systemic implementation failures that can and should be addressed through better governance, not abandonment of the oversight function itself.

A Critical Juncture, Not an Endpoint

Robin Copley’s resignation in October creates a pivotal opportunity to reset the office’s trajectory. Rather than abandoning the OIM, this is precisely the moment to get the hiring right. The next Independent Monitor must be someone with demonstrated expertise in police oversight, investigative experience, a track record of getting results in complex governmental environments, and the leadership skills to build a new department from the ground up.

This role requires someone who can navigate the inherent tensions of independent oversight—maintaining credibility with both the police department and the community, establishing clear processes and protocols, delivering data-driven analysis, and managing stakeholder relationships effectively. The first hire struggled in part because these complex requirements were not adequately prioritized in the selection process. The PCOB now has the benefit of experience and the responsibility to conduct a rigorous search that prioritizes qualifications, effectiveness, and proven leadership.

Defunding the office now would waste the institutional learning from the past three years and abandon this chance to establish the OIM as the accountable, professional oversight body Madison needs. The foundation has been laid—the ordinance, the structure, the community relationships, the MOU with MPD. What’s required is exemplary leadership to activate that foundation and deliver results.

Moving Forward: Better Deployment, Not Defunding

I urge the Council to reject this amendment and instead focus on improving the OIM’s deployment and effectiveness:

1. Conduct a rigorous search for qualified leadership: Prioritize experience in police oversight, investigations, and data-driven policy analysis. The selection process should be transparent and focused on identifying the candidate best positioned to make the office effective.

   
   

2. Strengthen PCOB governance and accountability: Establish clear performance expectations, regular reporting requirements, and mechanisms for the Council to monitor progress without compromising the office’s independence.

   
   

3. Provide adequate administrative support: Ensure the OIM has access to necessary city resources—legal counsel, HR support, IT infrastructure—while maintaining its independence in oversight functions.

   
   

4. Set clear, measurable goals: Work with the new Independent Monitor to establish specific deliverables and timelines that can be evaluated objectively.

   
   

5. Commit to sustained oversight: The Council must exercise its oversight responsibilities more actively, particularly regarding the PCOB’s governance of the OIM.

The proposed amendment frames this as an either-or choice between oversight and body-worn camera implementation. This is a false dichotomy. Both functions serve public safety and accountability. If the Police Department requires additional resources for body-worn camera staffing, that need should be addressed through its own merits, not by dismantling civilian oversight.

Conclusion

The need that sparked the OIM’s creation persists. The strategic framework for independent civilian oversight remains sound. What has failed is the execution, and execution problems can be solved. Walking away from this effort now, after years of work to create this groundbreaking oversight structure, would be a profound disappointment to the community members who advocated for police accountability and reform. It would also represent a profound loss to the community that expects accountability and better performance from our police department.

I strongly urge you to maintain funding for the OIM and PCOB, and to commit to the governance improvements necessary to make these offices effective. This is not the time to abandon police oversight—it is the time to get it right.

Thank you for your consideration. 77SquareMiles.com covers what mainstream media won’t—because democracy dies in darkness, especially at City Hall. 

© Alex Saloutos 2025.